First District Panel Victories

Results: 391 - 400 of 630
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A159914

[Published Opinion] The Court of Appeal held that, under the plain language of Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1), a court is required to receive a parole agency’s written report before ruling on a parole revocation petition initiated by a district attorney. This is the case even when such a petition is filed against a lifetime parolee, because the report is not pointless even though a court has no discretion to impose intermediate sanctions.

A159154

Based on appellant’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse, the trial court imposed two consecutive 25 years to life terms. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court erroneously believed it was required to do so under Penal Code section 667.61, and remanded the matter so that the trial court may exercise informed discretion.  

A159191

Pursuant to the recent amendment to Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a) (Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)), the Court of Appeal ordered that appellant’s probation be reduced from three years to two years.

A159537

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court violated appellant’s right to counsel when it denied her requests to substitute her newly retained attorney on the first day of trial and for a continuance to allow him to prepare. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that there was an absence of evidence to support the proposed continuance would significantly inconvenience the court or parties or that appellant’s request was the result of “gamesmanship.” To the contrary, the Court explained that the record showed appellant’s request to substitute counsel was based on a longstanding and genuine desire to replace her appointed attorney, and that her family was unable to secure sufficient funding until just before the date set for trial.

A162399

In an appeal from disposition, the Court of Appeal agreed that the juvenile court erred when it removed the child from father. The Court found that there was no substantial evidence that the child could not safely remain in father’s physical custody under the supervision of the juvenile court, with appropriate safeguards to ensure her safety and protection. The Court noted that the question of protective measures less drastic than removal from father’s custody were scarcely considered by the juvenile court.

A162584

The Court of Appeal reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded the matter for a new WIC section 366.26 hearing in light of the legal standards articulated in In re Caden C. The Court did not reach the issue of whether or not the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to grant mother’s request for continuance to clarify the caretaker aunt’s preference as to the permanent plan, but did indicate that the aunt’s preference and the applicability of the relative guardian exception to the termination of parental rights should be considered on remand.

A161128

[Published Opinion] Finding no rational basis to deny those convicted of Penal Code section 18710 (simple possession of a destructive devise) the benefits of a county jail sentence that the Realignment Legislation affords those convicted of the more serious Penal Code section 1170(h)-eligible destructive device offenses, the Court of Appeal reformed section 18710 to make its violation punishable under the sentencing provisions of section 1170(h). The Court then remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to terminate appellant’s post-release supervision and to modify the judgment consistent with its opinion.

A159264

The Court of Appeal held that, pursuant to Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), appellant’s prison prior enhancement must be stricken because appellant did not serve a prior prison term for a sexually violent offense. In addition, pursuant to section 654, the trial court erred by imposing concurrent sentences for arson and vandalism because they arose from an indivisible course of conduct. Finally, the Court found that the trial court erred by limiting appellant’s presentence conduct credit under section 2933.1, because appellant was not convicted of a violent felony; thus, section 4019 governed.

A159606

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred by weighing the evidence at the prima facie stage of an 1170.95 resentencing petition to discredit appellant’s averment that he was not the actual killer and to find, based on the evidence, that appellant was the actual killer. The Court, therefore, reversed the trial court’s order denying the petition and remanded the matter with directions to issue an order to show cause under section 1170.95, subdivision (c) and hold a hearing pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d) to determine whether to vacate appellant’s murder conviction and recall his sentence and resentence him.

A157062

[Published Opinion] The Court of Appeal remanded the case to allow the trial court to analyze appellant’s Romero motion in conformity with the spirit of the law. In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized that the trial court did not appear to “appropriately considered the facts and circumstances of [appellant’s] current and prior offenses, or her particular background, character, and prospects.”